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REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The issues of practical construction and latent ambiguity
continually were raised with the trial court by Defendant Franz C.
Stangl, III and the other Defendants ("Stangl") and are reflected
in the testimony proffered by Stangl.

These issues permeated the

case and are central to the decision at hand.

Although Stangl did

not specifically refer to the doctrines of practical construction
or latent ambiguity by their formal names, the lack of a specific
reference to the formal name does not preclude Stangl from citing
to those doctrines on appeal.

General reference to the legal

principles underlying a legal doctrine sufficiently preserves the
relevant issues. Appellate courts uniformly adhere to this principle.

Parol evidence is allowed to explain the meaning of documents
when

both

parties

to

a

contract

demonstrate

a

different

interpretation and understanding by their actions. The doctrine of
practical construction is an exception to the parol evidence rule.
Once the parties demonstrate by their actions that to them the
contract has a particular meaning, the intent of the parties will
be enforced and parol evidence is admitted.

In order to enforce

the intent of the parties, it is necessary for the court to hear
all extrinsic evidence.
Stangl is neither estopped from asserting the ultra vires
defense nor did the legislature ratify the transaction.

The

principles of waiver and estoppel cannot be applied to circumvent
stated legislative intent and policy. A contract which violates a
statute is void ab initio and cannot be ratified or approved in any
manner so as to create an enforceable liability.
In addition, the amendment of the statute did not act so as to
ratify the transaction.

The amendment to the statute affected the

substantive rights of the parties and specifically enlarged the
rights and duties of Plaintiff Utah State Retirement Board, as
trustee of the Utah State Retirement Fund, ('"Fund" ) by allowing it
to invest in a broader range of mortgages. The statutory amendment
did much more than merely affect the legal machinery by which the
Fund's rights and duties are determined. Accordingly, the statute
cannot be applied retroactively.
The Fund has failed in any meaningful way to defend against
Stanglf s argument that the trial court improperly awarded compound
interest.

Compound interest is not allowed unless the parties

expressly agree to it because of its extremely onerous effect. The

Fund has failed to demonstrate that the parties expressly agreed to
compound interest and, accordingly, the award of compound interest
is clearly improper.
ARGUMENT
I.
THE ISSUES ON APPEAL WERE SUFFICIENTLY
RAISED BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT
The Fund asserts that Stangl failed to argue to the trial
court

the

doctrine

of

practical

construction

transaction documents contain a latent ambiguity*

and

that

the

The Fund has

ignored or overlooked numerous references to these doctrines in the
record below and attempts to raise a procedural scapegoat to avoid
facing

the merits

of

these

issues.

The

issues

of

practical

construction and latent ambiguity continually were raised before
the trial court, and are reflected by the testimony proffered by
Stangl.

These issues permeated the trial and are central to the

decision at hand.
In James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), this
court held that
submitted

fl

[a] matter is sufficiently raised if it has been

to the trial court and the trial court has had the

opportunity to make findings of fact or law."

Id. at 801.

In the

present case, Stangl persistently raised the issues of practical
construction and latent ambiguity with the trial court.

Judge

Bunnell ruled on these issues by not allowing the introduction of
any parol evidence and by rejecting Stangl f s arguments that this
evidence

should

have

been

admitted.

Accordingly,

Stangl

sufficiently raised the issues of practical construction and latent
ambiguity because the Court had the opportunity to rule on these

issues.

Moreover,

it

is

irrelevant

that

Stangl

did

not

specifically refer to these doctrines by their formal names.
The lack of a specific reference to the formal name of the
doctrine does not preclude Stangl from citing to that doctrine on
appeal. General reference to the legal principle(s) underlying the
doctrine sufficiently preserves the relevant issues.
courts uniformly adhere to this principle.

Appellate

In Danes v. Automobile

Underwriters, Inc. 307 N.E.2d 902 (Ind. Ct. App. 1974), the Indiana
Court of Appeals was faced with a similar situation, although
involving a statute.

In Danes, the plaintiff, who was acting as

guardian for her minor child, sought a declaration that a previous
release of her daughter's claims against an uninsured motorist
pursuant to a settlement entered into by the plaintiff be declared
void.

Although the plaintiff argued the release was "'void ab

initio' as against public policy," the plaintiff failed to cite to
an Indiana statute which specifically required that a compromise or
settlement of a minor's claim is valid only when approved by the
court. Id. at 903. The plaintiff first made specific reference to
the statute itself in the plaintiff's appellate brief.

Although

the defendant insurer asserted that the citation of the statute
gave rise to a new issue on appeal which was not before the trial
court, the appellate court disagreed stating that the plaintiff
persistently argued that a minor's claim may
not be compromised or settled without court
approval . . . . Questions within the issues
and before the trial court are before the
appellee (sic) court, and new arguments and
authorities may with strict priority be
brought forward.
Id. at 905 (emphasis added).

A

In Wojt v. Chimacum School Dist. No. 49, 516 P.2d 1099 (Wash,
Ct. App. 1973), the Washington court similarly held that a failure
specifically to cite to a statute did not preclude the appellant
from bringing the statute to the court' s attention during the
appeal.

Id. at 1103 n.4.

In Wojt, the plaintiff challenged the

legal sufficiency of the stated causes for his discharge from one
of the defendant's schools, but failed to cite to the court a
statute which required the promulgation of evaluative guidelines
concerning teaching and other classroom-related performance.

In

holding that the plaintiff could cite to the court the statute for
the first time on appeal, the court stated that the primary issue
before the trial court was the legal sufficiency of the stated
causes

for

discharge

and,

accordingly

"[a]11

statutes

and

authorities which bear upon the issue of the sufficiency of the
causes are therefore properly before this court." Id. (emphasis in
original).
Other courts have also held that the failure to specifically
cite to a statute at trial did not preclude its citation during
appeal. See, e.g., Independent Nat'l Bank v. Westmoor Elec. Inc.,
795 P.2d 210 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990) (where defendant failed to cite
to Arizona statute providing for set-off, the court found that
defendant's

general

argument

concerning

set-off

sufficiently

preserved argument for appeal); Hartwell Corp. v. Smith, 686 P.2d
79

(Idaho

Ct. App.

1984)

(general

reference

to

statute

of

limitations, but failure to specifically cite statute, did not
preclude its use during appeal).
In the present case, although Stangl did not specifically cite
to the doctrine of practical construction, Stangl did persistently

argue that theory to the trial court. Counsel for Stangl asserted
that the conduct of the parties created an ambiguity in the
partnership agreement and transaction documents that did not exist
on the face of the documents, and that parol evidence, thus, should
be received.

During the trial, Stangl proffered testimony from

both himself and Butch Johnson that the parties had treated the
transaction as an equity transaction and not a loan transaction.
As more fully set forth in Appellant's prior brief, Mr. Johnson
testified as follows:
Q:

Subsequently to that point, Mr. Johnson,
if you know, how did the State Retirement
Fund carry the Creekview Property on
their books? Was it treated as a loan or
equity or both or do you know?

A:

It was treated as an equity.

(Trial Transcript of January 30, 1991 (emphasis added)).
Counsel for Stangl further questioned William Chipman, Mr.
Johnson's successor at the Fund, about the Fund's characterization
of the transaction between the parties.

The court sustained an

objection to the question, stating:
Objection sustained. I do that on the ground
what his category or even the Fund's category
of treatment as far as their internal
operation is concerned does not change the
legal obligations on the parties as reflected
by the documents they executed.
(Trial Transcript of January 30, 1991 at 236-37 (emphasis added)).
Because Stangl continually attempted to introduce evidence on
the issue of the parties' treatment and conduct with respect to the
transaction, and asserted that this evidence created an ambiguity
thus allowing parol evidence, Stangl has sufficiently preserved the
issue of the doctrine of practical construction for this appeal,

regardless of whether Stangl specifically cited to the trial court
the formal name of the doctrine.
In addition, the issue of latent ambiguity was sufficiently
raised at trial.

As Stangl testified at trial, it simply did not

make sense that he would contribute $500,000 to a partnership for
a 20% interest and assume personal responsibility for a $4.35
million dollar loan, while at the same time, the Fund contributed
$100.00 for an 80% interest in the partnership and assumed no risk
with respect to the loan.

Such a construction of the agreements

would produce an absurd result.

As testified to by Stangl during

his proffer:
I was not willing to pay for 100% of the debt
of an empty shopping center to a partner,
whofs the lender, and get back nothing but
paid receipts, and in the end have to give
them 80 percent ownership in the property that
I had to pay for. It was never part of the
bargain; it was never negotiated.
It never
entered my mind in any way that that was going
to be required to do so.
(Trial Transcript of January 30, 1991 at 77.)
Accordingly, because Stangl argued that the conduct of the
parties

created

an

ambiguity

and

that

the

effect

of

these

documents, as now read by the Fund, would produce an absurd result,
the issue of latent ambiguity was preserved for appeal.
II.
THE DOCTRINE OF PRACTICAL CONSTRUCTION IS AN
EXCEPTION TO THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE
As set forth in Stanglfs prior brief, parol evidence is
allowed to explain the meaning of documents when both parties to
the contract demonstrate a different meaning by their actions.
See, e.g., Bullfrog Marina, Inc. v. Lentz, 501 P.2d 266 (Utah
7

1972); Bullough v. Sims, 400 P.2d 20 (Utah 1965); EIE v. St.
Benedicts Hosp., 638 P. 2d 1190 (Utah 1981).

The Fund, however,

asserts that the doctrine of practical construction does not allow
parol evidence and that these rules are "mutually exclusive."
Brief of Appellee, p. 12.

As stated by the Fund, "[e]ven if a

court were to apply the doctrine of practical construction, the
parol evidence rule would still exclude extrinsic evidence of
contemporaneous conversations, representations, or statements of
what

the

parties

intended,

thought,

believed

or

understood

concerning the interpretation or the purpose of the writings.
Courts applying the doctrine of practical construction may only
consider the parties1 post-execution actions and performance."
Brief of Appellee, p. 13 (emphasis in original).

The Fund appears

to have twisted the doctrine of practical construction so as to
completely nullify its effect and has offered no support for this
assertion.
The doctrine of practical construction is an exception to the
parol evidence rule, and once the court applies the doctrine, parol
evidence is received. That is the express purpose of the doctrine.
As set forth in EIE v. St. Benedicts Hosp., 638 P.2d 1190 (Utah
1981), once the parties demonstrate by their actions that to them,
the contract has a particular meaning, "the intent of the parties
will be enforced."

Id. at 1195 (emphasis added) (citing Bullfrog

Marina v. Lentz, 501 P.2d 266, 271 (Utah 1972); Bullough v. Sims,
400 P.2d 20, 23 (Utah 1965)).

In order to enforce the "intent" of

the parties, it is necessary for the court to hear all relevant
extrinsic evidence.

Moreover, the doctrine of practical construction will not
bring the commercial world to its knees as the Fund seems to
suggest. Inherent within the doctrine of practical construction is
a requirement that the party asserting the doctrine show through
conduct and actions that to the parties involved the contract meant
something different. Accordingly, there is the built-in safeguard
of the applicable burden of proof.
As the Fund suggests, parties must be assured their contracts
will be enforced by the courts, but their enforcement should be in
the same manner the parties have conducted themselves and not in
accordance with a contrived reading of the agreement. One party to
a contract should not be permitted to hide behind a newly feigned
contractual interpretation when that party knows very well, and has
acted as if, the provision means something quite different.

This

is the precise purpose for the doctrine of practical construction.
In the present case, Stangl attempted to introduce evidence
regarding the conduct and intent of the parties, but was precluded
from doing so by the trial court.

Although the Fund strenuously

objected at trial to the introduction of any of this evidence, the
Fund now appears to be arguing their case and proffering evidence
in their brief that was neither offered nor received at trial,
which supposedly supports their position that the conduct of the
parties would not require a different reading of the agreement.
The Fund also asserts that Stanglf s briefs demonstrate an
uncertainty regarding the purpose of the transaction and that there
is an inconsistency in the briefs.
Stanglfs briefs.

There is no inconsistency in

The briefs, however, point to and emphasize

different reasons why the transaction was structured in the manner

it was. The transaction was evidenced by loan agreements to enable
the Fund to acquire an ownership interest in an income-producing
property and to provide Stangl with certain tax benefits.
As Stangl testified, the "loan" documents were used merely as
a "scorekeeping method" for the Fund.

Stangl had no objection to

structuring the transaction in this manner because it provided him
with certain tax benefits.

Although these tax benefits were of

value to him, they did not offset, as the Fund suggests, any
disproportionate allocation of interest and risk. Under the Fund's
scenario, Stangl contributed to the partnership property worth
$500,000 and received a 20% interest, while at the same time the
Fund contributed only $100 and a promise to make a loan and
received an 80% interest. Under this scenario, Stangl also assumed
sole liability for the loan.

Whatever the tax benefits may have

been from structuring the transaction as a loan, they do not offset
instantly giving away $400,000 of value and assuming sole liability
for a $4.35 million loan.
In addition, the Fund asserts that Stangl's briefs leave many
questions unanswered, such as what conduct of the Fund after the
closing is inconsistent with the documents; where is the ambiguity;
what

is

the

relevance

of

the

Fund's

80% ownership

in

the

Partnership; why does Stangl believe that the notes and guarantees
are unenforceable; and why does Stangl believe that the notes do
not need to be repaid simply because the Fund owned 80% of the
partnership. Brief of Appellees, p. 22. These questions, however,
have been answered.
After signing the agreements, the Fund continued to book the
transaction and the Fund's investment as equity.

The Fund also

made this representation to its auditors.

In addition, Mr.

Johnson, who was a former employee of the Fund and responsible for
this agreement, testified that the Fund treated its investment as
an equity investment. The Fund also excused Stangl from making the
"payments" for a seven month period, with no penalty or adverse
action taken against him.

The ambiguity arises because of the

parties1 treatment of the transaction as an equity investment,
while the documents on their face treat the transaction as a loan.
The Fund's 80% ownership in the Partnership further supports
Stanglf s position that the Fund had made an equity investment.
Otherwise, the Fund would instantly receive an 80% interest in
property worth $500,000 for only making a loan. Finally, the notes
are unenforceable and do not need to be repaid because of the
doctrine of practical construction. The parties, by their actions
and conduct, have shown that to them the contract meant something
completely different.
An appellate brief, however, is neither the place nor the
vehicle to introduce new evidence or to make factual arguments.
The proper place is an evidentiary hearing.

Accordingly, this

Court should remand this case to the trial court to hear all of the
evidence relative to the conduct of the parties so that the meaning
and intent of the parties may be established.
III.
THE LOAN AGREEMENT CONSTITUTED AN ULTRA VIRES ACT
BECAUSE IT WAS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF THE FUND'S AUTHORITY
The Fund's supposed defenses to the ultra vires issue, that
Stangl is estopped from asserting the ultra vires defense and the
that the legislature ratified the "loan" transaction, are shams and
11

are unsupported by the case law. The Fund cites Town of Gila Bend
v. Walled Lake Door Co., 490 P.2d 551 (Ariz. 1971), in support of
its estoppel argument. The Fund quotes from this case that "' [i]t
would be grossly unfair to all concerned to allow the Town to idly
sit back and reap the benefits of its bargain without requiring it
to pay accordingly.f"

Brief of Appellees, pp. 35-36 (quoting Town

of Gila Bend, 490 P. 2d at 558).

However, the Fund has grossly

taken this quote out of context and has misstated the holding of
the case.

Immediately following the Fund's quote, the court in

Gila Bend stated:
Relative to the contention that
waiver cannot be used to prevent
asserting the illegality of a
agree.
In the instant case,
agreement was not illegal.

estoppel and
the Town from
contract, we
however, the

In a proper case, the principles of waiver
and estoppel cannot be applied to circumvent
stated legislative intent and policy, nor can
a contract which violates A.R.S. § 42-303,
subsec. D and is, therefore, void ab initio be
ratified or approved in
any
manner
by
defendant or its officers or any other person
so as to create an enforceable liability.
Id. at 558 (emphasis added).
The Fund's ratification argument similarly has no merit. The
Fund cites Washington Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Sherwood Assoc, 795 P.2d
665 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), for the proposition that " f a statute may
be applied retroactively if it affects only procedural and not
substantive rights.1" Brief of Appellee, p. 37 (quoting Washington
Nat11, 795 P. 2d at 667). The Fund, however, provides no argument
or authority as to whether the statutory amendment in this case is
procedural or substantive.

As set forth in Washington Nat'l,

"[s]ubstantive law is defined as the positive
law which creates, defines and regulates the

rights and duties of the parties and which may
give rise to a cause of action, as
distinguished
from
adjective
law which
pertains to and prescribes the practice and
procedure or the legal machinery by which the
substantive law is determined
or made
effective."
795 P.2d at 669 (quoting Petty v. Clark, 192 P.2d 589, 593-94 (Utah
1948)).

The Washington Nat'1 court further stated that "[i]f a

statutory amendment changes the contractual rights and obligations
of the parties, it is substantive."
In

the present

case, the

Id. at 669.

statute

created,

defined

and

regulated the rights and duties of the Fund by setting forth the
investments which it could make.

The amendment in this case

specifically enlarged the rights and duties of the Fund by allowing
it to invest in a broader range of mortgages.

The statutory

amendment does much more than merely affect the legal machinery by
which the Fund's rights and duties are determined.

The statutory

amendment is substantive and not procedural, and therefore, the
statute cannot be applied retroactively.
As set forth in Stanglfs prior brief, a court should make
every aittempt to interpret a document in order to give it legal
effect.

Stangl v. Todd, 554 P.2d 1316, 1319-20 (Utah 1976).

In

order to give legal effect to the subject documents in this case,
the Court must construe them in accordance with the intentions and
conduct of the parties, which was an equity investment.
IV.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING COMPOUND INTEREST
The Fund has failed in any meaningful way to oppose Stanglf s
argument that the trial court improperly awarded compound interest.
Instead, the Fund states that the compound interest issue was
13

addressed in the prior briefs in the first appeal and that "there
exists no reason to rehash that issue again."
p. 38.

Brief of Appellee,

The simple fact is that compound interest is not allowed

unless the parties expressly agree to compound interest.

See

Mountain States Broadcasting Co. v. Neale, 776 P.2d 643, 647 (Utah
Ct. App. 1989).

The reason for this requirement is the extremely

onerous effect compound interest can have.

As an example, the

difference in interest between simple and compound interest in this
case would be in excess of $300,000.00.

The Fund has failed to

distinguish the Mountain States case or to show how the parties
expressly

agreed

to

compound

interest

in

the

present case.

Accordingly, the award of compound interest is improper and the
case must be remanded for a determination of the proper amount of
interest calculated on a simple interest basis.

CONCLUSION
Based on the arguments contained in this Brief, Stanglfs
initial brief filed on October 28, 1992 and the Brief of Appellant
and Reply Brief of Appellant filed March 28, 1991 and June 17,
1991, respectively, defendants respectfully request this Court to
reverse and remand with the following instructions to the trial
court: (1) to receive and consider evidence of the parties' intent
in entering the partnership agreement and loan document; (2) to
apply the law concerning the legality of the loans; (3) to change
the interest on any judgment entered to simple interest; (4) to
order the entry of a satisfaction of the summary judgment so that
there are no duplicate judgments against Stangl; and (5) to order

1 A

Judge Bunnell to recuse himself from further trial or pre-trial
proceedings in the case.
Respectfully submitted this
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day of August, 1993.
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